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Abstract 
 
A recent development in South African environmental law is the 
use of plea and sentencing agreements. The main objective of 
environmental law is to promote the sustainable use of natural 
resources while preventing pollution and ecological degradation. 
Grand environmental due diligence processes could achieve 
sustainable development; the use of criminal sanctions with 
sentencing agreements could be more effective. This paper 
answers the question whether the plea and sentencing 
agreements in reality achieve the objectives of environmental 
regulation? This study analyses this recent development by 
looking at selected recent cases in South Africa. The study found 
that plea and sentence agreements are potentially effective, 
subject to the effective monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement against non-compliance with the undertakings 
made by the accused person. Without institutional strengthening 
and effective monitoring, the plea and sentence agreement 
procedure remains ineffective. 
Keywords 
Environmental law; compliance and enforcement; plea and 
sentence agreements; criminal sanctions; South Africa.  
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1 Introduction: Legal context of criminal environmental 
enforcement 
A fundamental challenge for environmental law globally and in South Africa 
is the inability to design, develop and implement effective enforcement tools. 
Generally, many countries have modernised their environmental legislation 
to include framework environmental legislation, which provides the broader 
structure, key principles and norms, and the institutional architecture for 
environmental regulation.1 Similarly, many countries have developed good 
sectoral environmental laws such as legislation on water, air pollution 
control, waste, hazardous substances control, marine resources and marine 
pollution, environmental planning and environmental impact assessment.2 
A typical feature of the enforcement provisions in most environmental 
legislation is the persistence of criminal penalties or sanctions as a method 
of punishing environmental offenders. Invariably, for example, all of South 
African environmental legislation uses criminal penalties to enforce its 
prescriptions. The standard "offences" clause is an ingrained element of 
most environmental statutes. The use of "offences" per se shows that 
criminal penalties remain the preferred enforcement mechanism,3 while 
other enforcement mechanisms such as economic instruments and civil 
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1  Faure and Du Plessis "Comparative and Concluding Remarks" 596: "Many African 
countries have also moved to some sort of codification of environmental law in the 
sense that they provide for an environmental framework law. This is the case, for 
example, in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Uganda." 
2  Many countries now have environmental management statutes focussed on specific 
aspects or components of the environment.  
3  Patterson "Incentive-based Measures" 306 ("… with criminal law being the primary 
tool for ensuring compliance and enforcement, the noted deficiencies of the criminal 
process are relevant"); also see Holder and Lee Environmental Protection, Law and 
Policy 382 (commenting that "Enforcement of environmental law in the UK relies 
heavily on the existence of criminal law but criminal law is rarely the first resort of 
regulators; negotiation is usually the starting point, and administrative, rather than 
criminal sanctions have real attractions".) 
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remedies are by default regarded as the alternatives.4 The predominance 
of criminal penalty provisions overshadows the few clauses on alternative 
enforcement methods such as administrative measures and market-based 
incentives. The suitability of some market-based instruments for Africa has 
been questioned, however. 
Despite its continued use, criminal law as part of the chief command and 
control tool, has proved limited in its ability to achieve its inherent aims of 
the deterrence and punishment of environmental offenders.5 Concomitantly, 
criminal law has also struggled to achieve the aims of environmental law, 
namely to clean up contamination or rehabilitate degraded environments.6 
While preferred, criminal law is bedevilled by several weakness. A detailed 
study of the strength and weakness of criminal environmental enforcement 
has been exhaustively done.7 Generally the weaknesses include the huge 
costs, the reactive nature of criminal law,8 the low conviction rates, the low 
fines,9 poor crime detection and investigation skills, and the lack of expertise 
among the prosecutors and the judiciary.10 These weaknesses can be more 
                                            
4  The tendency to rely on criminal enforcement is empirically demonstrated by the 
National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 2013/14 compiled by 
the Environmental Management Inspectorate (EMI). The report records "Arrests" of 
1339 (in 2011), 1818 (in 2012), and 1371 in 2013 (DEA EMI 2014 
2013/14https://www.environment.gov.za/otherdocuments/reports#compliance2013
_14). Contrast this with “Directives issued” for the same years, being 49, 36 and 60, 
and the number of "Civil court applications", namely 7, 4 and 2. The picture remains 
the same in the 2016/17 Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 13 
with recorded "Arrests" being 1259 (2014), 939 (2015) and 1092 (2016/17), while 
the number of cases where an alternative enforcement measure was adopted are 
all below 200 (DEA EMI 2017 https://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/NECER-2016-17.pdf). Demonstrably, alternative 
enforcement measures are underutilised and there is a preference for criminal 
arrests and prosecution.  
5  Du Plessis and Nel "Driving Compliance to and Enforcement of South African 
Legislation" 262; also see Kidd "Criminal Measures" 242-243 (detailing the inherent 
and contingent weakness of criminal sanctions). 
6  Of the six cases of plea and sentence agreements discussed in this article, only in 
one case (S v Acker (Hermanus Regional Court) (unreported) case number ECH 
100/05 (October 2005) (S v Acker)) were researchers able to get a meaningful 
progress report which indicated that the prosecutors had enforced the undertakings 
therein. On the other five cases there was either no response or just promises of 
progress reports which never materialised to the date of publication.  
7  Kidd "Criminal Measures". 
8  Patterson "Incentive-based Measures" 307 ("it is generally reactive as opposed to 
proactive and, accordingly, an inappropriate tool for preventing environmental 
degradation"). 
9  Holder and Lee Environmental Protection, Law and Policy 395 (lamenting the 
ineffectiveness of criminal fines against well-resourced corporations). 
10  Glazewski Environmental Law ch 26-17; also see Mueller "Essay on Environmental 
Criminality" 7; Kidd "Criminal Measures" 265. 
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pronounced when dealing with corporate offenders, who are increasing the 
major violators of environmental laws. 
The manifestation and prominence of these weaknesses vary from one 
jurisdiction to another11 with a number of developed countries now having 
relatively improved the efficacy of criminal environmental enforcement. 
There is now a huge body of literature on these varied jurisdictional 
experiences with criminal enforcement of environmental law.12 This is often 
achieved through, among other means, the establishment of environmental 
courts or tribunals,13 the provision of specialist training to crime 
investigators, prosecutors and the judiciary on environmental offences, and 
stiffer penalties coupled with strict liability.14 Specialised courts have 
proliferated across the world, with different impacts on environmental 
enforcement and public interest environmental litigation.15 
In South Africa the weaknesses of criminal environmental enforcement 
largely remains an issue, and beyond an experimental attempt with marine 
resources, South Africa does not as yet have specialised environmental 
courts.16 This is so, given the general weakness of South Africa's criminal 
justice system, which is plagued by delays, inefficiencies including the poor 
management of evidence, low conviction rates, and a general inability to 
deal with the influx of criminal cases coming through the system.17 In this 
                                            
11  Kidd "Criminal Measures" 242 notes that these weaknesses are found in most 
criminal law systems. 
12  Billiet, Blondiau and Rousseau 2014 Regul Gov; Strock 1990 Geo Wash L Rev 916; 
also see generally Faure et al. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law for an 
extensive regional survey of selected European Union member states; White Crimes 
against Nature (exploring in extensive detail the criminology of environmental harm, 
its philosophical foundations, and the legal nature of criminal environmental 
enforcement.); White 2012 Australasian Policing 7-11 (discussing the role of civil 
society organisations in enabling criminal enforcement of environmental law); also 
see Wellsmith 2011 Eur J Crim Policy Res 125-148; Ruggiero and South 2013 Crit 
Criminol. 
13  Extensive literature now exits on the growth of environmental courts and tribunals 
worldwide. For comprehensive surveys and studies see generally, Pring and Pring 
Greening Justice; Pring and Pring 2009 Or Rev Int'l L 301-329; Preston 2014 JEL 
365-393; Robinson 2012 Pace Envtl L Rev 363-395. (These studies analyse the 
factors contributing to the success of environmental courts as well as other 
implications of environmental courts for environmental rights, access to justice and 
environmental enforcement.)  
14  Wang 2016 FJHSS 607. 
15  Pring and Pring Greening Justice; Pring and Pring 2009 Or Rev Int'l L 301-329; 
Preston 2014 JEL 365-393; Robinson 2012 Pace Envtl L Rev 363-395. 
16  Kings 2017 https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-09-environmentalists-are-winning-the-
battle-for-enforcement-of-the-law; also see generally Hauck and Kroece 2006 
Marine Policy. 
17  Pelser 2007 SACQ 1, 2-3; Leggett 2003 SACQ 11, 14. 
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paper we undertake an evaluation of recent developments in South African 
criminal environmental enforcement. Having highlighted the documented 
weakness of criminal sanctions, we hasten to caution that alternative 
enforcement mechanisms are not by themselves efficacious. Thus, 
pertinently, Faure concludes that: 
As long as command and control approaches are designed with at least one 
eye on cost saving, incentive-based systems are not necessarily superior. 
One therefore has to be careful not to distinguish the two systems too 
sharply.18 
Eventually, any mechanism may require enforcement, which ultimately 
could end with criminal sanction. A fortiori, the plea and sentencing 
agreement, the subject of this study, is designed within the criminal law 
system. 
There is an upsurge in the use by prosecutors and a judicial affinity towards 
what is generally called plea-bargaining leading to plea and sentence 
agreements. This is not to say that plea-bargaining is a recent legal 
development as such,19 but rather that the use of that procedure in 
environmental prosecutions coupled with innovative court orders 
(environmental service orders, compensation awards and research funding) 
is unique in environmental criminal enforcement. This innovation has the 
potential to provide possibilities to make environmental criminal 
enforcement effective, and other countries could draw lessons from the 
South African experiment. This approach has also been adopted in other 
countries such as the USA and Australia.20  
The research for this paper took two forms. Firstly, we performed a critical 
desktop analysis of the law and cases. Secondly, we used an empirical 
methodology partly to obtain feedback from expert administrators on the 
progress made in implementing plea and sentence cases. A concise sample 
of most relevant cases was selected for analysis. We augmented this with 
empirical follow-up surveys that were conducted with expert law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies involved in each case. The survey 
sought to elicit progress reports on the implementation of the plea 
agreements and the payment of agreed compensation. We summarised the 
                                            
18  Faure "Balancing of Interests" 24.  
19  See for example Bekker 1996 CILSA 168-222 (comparative analysis of plea 
agreements in the USA and South Africa in general and whether the USA principles 
were relevant to South Africa, which then did not have a legal framework for 
sentence bargaining). 
20  Abbot 2005 JEL 161-180. The lessons to be drawn are both positive and negative. 
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cases for relevance and distributed a questionnaire21 which asked 
prosecutors, magistrates or relevant government departments to provide 
feedback. While the study itself did not involve human subjects, ethical 
clearance was obtained to ensure that the administration of the electronic 
questionnaire complied with the requirements of ethical research.22 
This approach was adopted to complement and provide some practical 
information to augment the theoretical critical analysis of the plea and 
sentencing legal framework and how it has been used by the courts so far 
in South Africa. Through the theoretical and empirical review of some recent 
cases,23 we argue that the increasing use of plea and sentence agreements 
in South Africa may carry better prospects for achieving the real objectives 
of environmental regulation.  
The remedial orders and compensation awards24 strengthen the potential 
to align criminal law with the aims and outcomes of environmental 
regulation. It represents a departure from the orthodox use of criminal law, 
where the focus was largely on the prospect of deterring would-be offenders 
by heavily punishing the accused25 while the environment remained 
degraded.26 South Africa's experience can provide useful insights to other 
countries that wish to innovatively make criminal environmental 
enforcement more effective through consensus-based enforcement. This 
includes joint and transnational enforcement, especially in matters involving 
                                            
21  After a concise summary of each case and its outcome, the questionnaire, sent by 
email, contained the following questions: "We,… seek the following feedback: (a) 
state if the above sentence was complied with; (b) if the accused submitted 
compliance/rehabilitation reports (we kindly request copies of same if available) (c) 
and if there was no compliance, what were the consequences of not complying with 
the agreement. We would kindly appreciate it also if we are made aware of the 
consequences that followed in the case of non-compliance with the plea sentence 
conditions." 
22  Ethics Clearance Protocol Number: H19/06/24. 
23  This is not an exhaustive review of all the cases, since Magistrates courts, whose 
judgments are not reported, hear most of these cases. There are probably more 
cases that have not been picked up. 
24  Mandated both in terms s 34 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 (NEMA) and ss 297 and 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
25  Holder and Lee Environmental Protection, Law and Policy 393. 
26  In addition, any criminal fines paid by offenders would go to the government central 
revenue fund without being ring-fenced to support environmental regulation and 
enforcement efforts. South Africa and the USA have recently collaborated in one of 
the biggest cases to recover compensation from abalone poachers; see US v Bengis 
No 13-2543 (2d Cir 2015) (where the accused were ordered to pay US61 million, 
later reduced to US$22 million, although the South government believes this amount 
should have been US$100 million; Bengis v Government of South Africa; In re: 
Bengis v Government of South Africa 2016 2 All SA 459 (WCC); also see Glazewski 
2014 IJMCL 173-183. 
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international environmental crimes, as illustrated by the recent case of US 
v Bengis,27 for example. This approach could also be relevant to 
enforcement against environmental violations by transnational 
corporations.28  
We first highlight the fundamental objectives of environmental regulation, 
then we provide an overview of the general legislative framework for plea 
and sentencing agreements in South Africa. In the context of the general 
context provided in the first and second parts, the third part of the paper 
evaluates the application of plea and sentencing procedure in 
environmental enforcement, through selected illustrative cases. We 
conclude the paper by analysing the extent to which the use of plea and 
sentence agreements can result in better outcomes for the environment, 
noting possible challenges to the procedure in South Africa. We also 
highlight areas for further research in this evolving area of environmental 
law. 
2 Objectives of environmental enforcement 
Environmentalists, whether in academic circles, civil society or government, 
often project the idea that the fundamental aim of environmental law is to 
promote environmental or ecological integrity.29 To the extent that 
environmental laws in fact enable any use of natural resources and some 
pollution, it is contestable whether it aims to achieve "ecological integrity" 
as such. Nevertheless, the human aspiration towards ecological integrity is 
undergirded by a desire to sustainably use natural resources with minimal 
environmental damage.  
In South Africa the objectives of environmental regulation are aptly captured 
in section 24 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to an 
                                            
27  US v Bengis No 13-2543 (2d Cir 2015) in which a US court under the Lacey Act, 
1900 handed a heavy sentence to rock lobster poachers who had smuggled their 
catch into the US. The Act provides that, "It is unlawful for any person… (2) to import, 
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign 
commerce- (A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation 
of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law". 16 USC § 
3372(a)(2)(A). 
28  White 2005 Curr Issues Crim Justice 276. 
29  Environmental or ecological integrity is not what many popularly want it to be. 
Pimentel, Westra and Noss "Ecological Integrity" 20 notes that "integrity" implies 
imagery wholeness, perfect and unimpaired; Bridgewater, Kim and Bosselman 2014 
Yb Int'l Env L 64 maintain that there is no consensus on what precisely "ecological 
integrity" means. 
T MUROMBO & I MUNYUKI  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
environment not harmful to health and well-being.30 The Constitution further 
imposes positive obligations on the state, through reasonable legislative or 
other measures, to prevent pollution and promote conservation, whilst 
ensuring that ecologically sustainable development can take place.31 These 
objectives of environmental regulation are not necessarily the core concern 
of criminal law, which serves a much broader purpose.32  
The framework environmental legislation, the National Environmental 
Management Act,33 also attests to the fundamental aims of environmental 
law. Other environmental legislation on water, air, biodiversity, and 
protected areas all equally reaffirm the constitutional focus on the 
sustainable use of natural resources and ecological integrity. Similarly, the 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act34 also espouses the 
principle of the sustainable use of mineral resources. Among several tools 
and strategies used in environmental law to achieve these regulatory 
objectives, we find land use plans, quality-based and technology-based 
pollution control tools and standards, together with the criminalisation of 
most violations of the environmental and natural resources legislation.  
Therefore, in an ideal world, given the aims of environmental law, the tools 
and measures used in legislation should proactively aim to pre-empt actions 
or conduct that has the potential to damage the environment, cause 
pollution or lead to the unsustainable use of natural resources. Debate 
continues on the relative merits of measures taken before harm (act-based) 
has occurred and those taken after harm (harm-based) has occurred to the 
environment.35 Permitting, licensing and planning tools would seem better 
suited to the objectives of environmental regulations than ex post facto 
enforcement measures.36 Discussing this intricate controversy, Rousseau 
                                            
30  Section 24(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). 
31  Section 24(b) of the Constitution. The notion of ecological sustainability is more 
realistic than that of maintaining "ecological integrity". 
32  Holder and Lee Environmental Protection, Law and Policy 393. 
33  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereafter the NEMA). 
34  Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (hereafter the 
MPRDA). Among other objects, s 2(h) provides that the MPRDA was enacted to 
"give effect to s 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the nation's mineral and 
petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable 
manner while promoting justifiable social and economic development". 
35  See Rousseau and Blondiau 2014 Environ Policy Gov 440 discussing the relative 
advantages of acts-based (before environmental damage) against harm-based 
(after damage is caused) environmental criminal sanctions. 
36  Rousseau and Blondiau 2014 Environ Policy Gov. 
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and Blondiau argue that: 
Both types of sanction have their strengths and weaknesses… The main 
strength of act-based sanctions is that they intervene at an early stage, i.e. 
before the harm is done. However, such an enforcement strategy can rapidly 
inflate the number of punishments imposed and thus the costs associated with 
prosecution and sanctioning. Moreover, act-based sanctions lead to 
overinclusion, since some of the individuals who are punished would not have 
caused environmental harm and thus punishing them does not protect the 
environment as such. This aspect of overinclusion can be problematic for 
scholars or policy makers who allow for punishment of conduct only when it 
gives rise to personal gains. However, from the point of view of deterrence, 
overinclusion is acceptable as long as it leads to a net reduction of harm and 
protects the environment.37 
However, the question that arises is what regulators and enforcement 
agencies should do with persons who – despite having permits, licences or 
authorisations – violate the terms and conditions of such permits and those 
who blatantly undertake environmentally regulated activities without 
complying with the prescripts of the law? Even if such acts do not result in 
significant harm to the environment. This is where act-based criminalisation 
becomes indispensable as the tried and tested tool to bring offenders to 
account. It is at this level that the unique objectives of environmental law 
give way to broader societal imperatives of arresting criminality.  
Another unanswered question is whether framing this as a criminal law 
issue is itself not a flawed foundation for the discourse? It could be argued 
that criminal law was not conceived to deal with the type of crimes that 
environmental crimes are. After all, many environmental offenders perceive 
their acts to be less reprehensible than heinous and egregious crimes like 
murder, robbery and rape.38 This psychology of the benign environmental 
"criminal" remains a constraint on the criminal enforcement of 
environmental law.39 Martín et al. rightly observe that "[e]nvironmental 
crimes harm both the environment and human beings but are not universally 
perceived as illegal, or even reproachable".40 Unless it is a reprehensible 
                                            
37  Rousseau and Blondiau 2014 Environ Policy Gov 440 (footnotes omitted)  
38  White 2017 Crime Law Soc Change 117 stating that "Environmental harms are 
frequently built into ordinary commercial practice and the everyday routines of 
people. The law both facilitates and reinforces the legitimacy of this, for example, by 
granting licenses to factories to pollute air and water, albeit within certain limits". 
39  Even the courts have at some point distinguished between the heinous crimes such 
as murder and robbery on the one hand, and what they call regulatory offences on 
the other hand, see S v Coetzee 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC) para 42, traversing USA 
and Canadian jurisprudence the court emphasised that "The distinction between the 
'truly criminal' and 'regulatory' offences has been discussed in various judgments in 
a number of jurisdictions". 
40  Martín et al. 2013 Soc Justice Res 321. 
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pandemic such as hacking horns off a rhino or a big oil spill, many people, 
and indeed criminal justice systems, remain oblivious to conduct that 
threatens, damages or pollutes the environment.41 A perennial issue within 
green criminology, for instance, is the perception that the formal institutions 
of criminal justice do not take environmental crime seriously enough. There 
is plenty of evidence to substantiate this claim. 
3 Plea and sentence agreements in general 
Criminal procedure in South Africa revolves around the architecture of the 
criminal code, which is the Criminal Procedure Act.42 This Act regulates pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial procedures in detail. Plea-bargaining43 had been 
happening under section 112(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
without the more detailed specific statutory guidelines introduced by the 
section 105A amendment.44 For the purposes of this paper, our focus is on 
the pre-trial procedure45 in the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 105A was 
introduced by an Amendment in 2001 to provide a formalised procedure for 
plea and sentence agreement negotiation and endorsement by the court.46 
This procedure applies to pending criminal cases in which the prosecutor or 
the accused, through her attorney, opts to negotiate the plea and a possible 
sentence. Certain legal requirements have to be fulfilled in order for parties 
to pursue this procedure. 
In detail, section 105A47 provides that upon authorisation by the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, the prosecutor and a legally represented 
accused may, before the commencement of the trial, negotiate and enter 
into an agreement regarding a guilty plea by the accused, a possible just 
                                            
41  Mueller "Essay on Environmental Criminality" 8; White 2017 Crime Law Soc Change 
118. 
42  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended (the Criminal Procedure Act). 
43  Defined by Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 15-5, as follows" "Plea bargaining 
can be defined as the procedure whereby the accused relinquishes the right to go to 
trial in exchange for a reduction in sentence; the prosecutor bargains away the 
possibility of a conviction in exchange for a punishment, which would be retributively 
just and cost the least in terms of the allocation of resources. In the process of 
bargaining, numerous assumptions are made. Provided a party is found to have 
acted freely and voluntarily, in sound and sober senses and without undue influence, 
the fact that the assumptions turn out to be false does not entitle such a party to 
resile from the agreement." 
44  North Western Dense Concrete CC v DPP, Western Cape 2000 2 SA 78 (C) 
(hereafter North Western Dense Concrete). 
45  Provided for in ss 105A and 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act. S 112 deals with the 
procedure where a plea of guilty is entered by the accused person. 
46  Bekker 1996 CILSA 217-218 (showing the non-existence of sentence guidelines or 
sentence bargaining in South Africa in 1996). 
47  Section 105 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for plea procedure. 
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sentence, or the postponing of sentencing subject to agreed conditions and 
any award of compensation.48  
The validity of the agreement between the prosecutor and accused is 
premised on certain principles of natural justice, administrative due process 
and meaningful consultation. Given the gravity of the consequences flowing 
from an accused abnegating the entitlement to defend herself and to have 
the state prove its case, it is critical that the accused be legally 
represented.49 The prosecutor, who must be authorised to engage in this 
procedure, must also inform the accused of her right to remain silent, and 
the presumption of innocence. The accused must also be advised that the 
plea and sentence agreement does not fetter the direction of the court to 
call for and hear evidence, should it deem it necessary. It is important for 
the prosecutor to ensure that the accused is acting as a free agent – freely 
and voluntarily – without any influence. This includes that the accused is 
under no obligation to engage in the negotiation process at all, and that once 
the agreement is sealed the court can still reject it.50  
Apart from the duty to ensure that the accused is fully briefed and informed 
of his/her rights, the prosecutor is required to consult certain parties before 
the agreement becomes valid. The prosecutor must consult with the 
investigating officer51 on the accused's profile, the circumstances of the 
offence, any previous convictions and the best interests of the community.52 
Lastly, the prosecutor must consult with the complainant (which in most 
environmental cases will be the environmental department or the affected 
community) and allow them to make representations regarding the 
proposed agreement and any proposed award of compensation or 
benefit/service order. 
However, the Act does not define "complainant", which implies that any 
person who has suffered harm or damage as a result of the environmental 
offence has a right to be consulted.53 This is critical in environmental 
                                            
48  Section 105A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act read with s 300, which empowers a 
Court convicting a person of a criminal offence to award compensation up to set 
amounts where the offence caused damage to or loss of property. Similarly, s 34B 
of the NEMA, South Africa's framework environmental statute, empowers a court 
which convicts an environmental offender to award a percentage not exceeding a 
quarter of any fine imposed to the person whose evidence led to the arrest and/or 
conviction of the accused.  
49  Section 105A(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
50  Sections 105A(2)(a)(i)-(iii)) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
51  Sections 105A(1)(b)(i) and 105A(1)(c)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
52  Section 105A(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
53  Section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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offences where it is often civil society and community environmental groups 
that should be consulted. 
When all the requirements are met, the parties must reduce the agreement 
into writing, sign it, and provide supporting documents for any consents or 
authorisations required.54 Section 105A(3) expressly prohibits the court 
from participating in the negotiation stage of the plea and sentence 
agreement.  
The court gets involved in the process at the accused's first appearance 
before it to face the charges. Once the accused is in the dock, the 
prosecutor announces to the court that an agreement has been negotiated 
and entered into, whereupon the court considers the circumstances in which 
the agreement was concluded as well as the terms of the agreement. 
Instead of merely rubber-stamping the agreement, a court must satisfy itself 
that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act have been fully complied 
with. The court must also satisfy itself that the accused was informed of his 
rights and that all required consultations have been done.55 
Thereafter the court can either ask the accused to actually plead in court 
and have the contents of the agreement read in court,56 or, if the court is not 
satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met, it can notify the 
prosecutor and the accused, providing reasons for its dissatisfaction and 
giving the parties an opportunity to rectify the non-compliance.57 
Where the court is satisfied that the technical statutory requirements are 
met, it proceeds to question the accused to confirm that the accused 
understands the charge, the facts of the crime, and that she acted freely 
and voluntarily, being of a sober mind, in concluding the agreement with the 
prosecution. This is to ensure that the accused has not pleaded guilty to a 
charge that she does not understand, or facts that do not disclose the 
offence charged. Given the requirement of legal representation, one would 
assume that the legal practitioner would have apprised the accused of these 
issues. Once satisfied that the accused understands the nature and 
implications of the agreement, the court hears submissions in aggravation 
and mitigation and the minimum statutory sentence, if any, applicable to the 
offence. Having confirmed the above, and being satisfied that the agreed 
                                            
54  Section 105A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
55  Sections 105A(4)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
56  Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 5-6 citing S v Solomons 2005 2 SACR 432 
(C) 435D-F; see s 105A(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
57  Section 105A(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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sentence is just, the court informs the parties, convicts the accused, and 
formally imposes the agreed sentence. 
It could happen that the court is satisfied with the guilty plea and the 
conviction of the accused, but not with the sentence agreed by the parties. 
In that event the court shall inform the parties of its view and advise the 
parties of what it considers a just sentence.58 The prosecution and the 
accused may accept the court's views, whereupon the case proceeds 
through the normal sentencing process. In this case the plea agreement 
stands, but the sentencing is left to the court to decide. The prosecutor and 
the accused may withdraw from the agreement, upon which it becomes null 
and void and the matter proceeds to trial de novo.59 If the latter happens, 
the agreement shall not be presented as evidence at the trial unless the 
accused consents to any admissions made being used in the trial. Clearly, 
the court does not abdicate its mandate to ensure that any sentence is 
commensurate with the degree of guilt and seriousness of the offence.  
The legislative provisions appear to be designed around the concept of the 
criminal accused as an individual, which begs the question of how effective 
this can be against corporate offenders, who are increasingly the major 
culprits in environmental crimes. 
3.1 The purpose of the plea and sentence procedures 
The purpose behind the elaborate procedure explained above is, 
perchance, to give the accused hope that by admitting to the crime and 
saving the court time and cost, she can get away with a lighter or non-
custodial sentence. Plea-bargaining is aimed at expediting the criminal 
process and serving the interests of both the state and the accused person, 
including "discounting the risk of acquittal" if the matter proceeded to trial.60 
In North Western Dense Concrete CC the court went to great lengths to 
articulate the merits and disadvantages of allowing the plea bargaining 
                                            
58  Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 15-7 citing S v Esterhuizen 2005 (1) SACR 
490 T 494H-I, where the court correctly cautions that "The fact that a lesser sentence 
has been agreed upon than that which would conceivably have been imposed at the 
end of a trail does not mean that justice has not been served." 
59  Sections 105A(6)(c) and (9)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
60  Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 15-5. Also see The National Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement Report 2009-10 (DEA EMI 2010 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/necer2009_10report.pdf 1) 
worryingly reporting that "There has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
acquittals from 18 in 2008/9 to 1026 2009/10". The rate of acquittals supports the 
argument that the plea and sentence agreement procedure could better serve the 
interests of the environment than the foolhardy pursuit of criminal prosecution.  
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process. It noted that while some attorneys and judges are averse to the 
process,61 it serves a good purpose.  
The court noted that, while academics had engaged with the plea 
agreement procedure, the response by the courts had been rather muted.62 
The court expressed concern that: 
[i]ndeed, the fact that it has received so little attention may indicate that it is 
neither a recognized nor a recognizable form of procedure. However, on 
consideration of the matter, the real reason why so little judicial attention has 
been given to this aspect of criminal procedure becomes apparent. From 
studies which have been carried out by eminent academics and no less 
august a body than the South African Law Commission, it appears as if some 
lawyers and judicial officers are uneasy about the "legality" of plea bargaining. 
They appear to shy away from recognizing that such a procedure exists. They 
not only avoid affording it recognition. They refuse to be associated in any way 
with such a procedure. They regard it with disfavour.63 
However, the academic writing on the plea bargaining process has to date 
not addressed the use of the process in the modern approach, which 
includes the making of compensation awards and environmental 
remediation orders.  
It is in this respect that our paper will stimulate further research and debate 
on whether this development promises a better use of criminal procedure in 
environmental enforcement. In North Western Dense Concrete CC the court 
also considered the merits of codifying the procedure and observed obiter 
that formalising the process would not necessarily make a difference.64 
However, we argue that it was important to formalise the procedure to 
ensure that prosecutors, accused persons and complainants have clear 
guidance and criteria for resorting to plea and sentencing agreement to 
serve the interests of justice and the accused. 
Another interest served by allowing the plea and sentencing agreement 
process is that it promotes the public interest in ensuring that matters that 
can quickly be resolved through consensus are so settled, while the court's 
resources are released to deal with contentious matters that merit a trial. 
This can decongest the criminal justice system while concomitantly 
encouraging quick remediation of the damaged environment. Generally, the 
process can also achieve better results for the complainants in the cases, 
                                            
61  North Western Dense Concrete 83A-B. 
62  North Western Dense Concrete 83B-D (citing Isakow and Van Zyl Smit 1985 De 
Rebus 17; Isakow, Van Zyl Smit and Isakow 1986 SAJCC 3-20; Clarke 1999 CILSA 
141-168). 
63  North Western Dense Concrete 82H-83A (footnotes omitted). 
64  North Western Dense Concrete 86H-J. 
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as there is a possibility of remedying the loss suffered through restitution 
orders.65 
In Jansen the court dealt with a pyramid scheme created by the accused to 
defraud many investors of their investments. A plea and sentence 
agreement was used to achieve an outcome that was better than sending 
Jansen to jail. The agreed sentence included repayment to the investors of 
their capital investments. As Abbot argues, "a fundamental principle in the 
sentencing of criminal defendants is that the offender should not profit from 
committing an offence and that the fine should aim at recovering any 
financial benefit accrued to the defendant".66 The court in Jansen therefore 
implemented this principle through a plea-bargaining and sentencing 
agreement coupled with an award of compensation. 
On the face of it, the plea and sentencing agreements supported by 
compensation awards, environmental remediation or service orders have 
great potential to achieve environmental remediation relative to the typical 
impositions of low criminal fines67 and imprisonment terms that characterise 
normal criminal penalties. Such fines end up in the central state treasury 
and cannot directly be used to remedy the damage, harm or injustice 
caused by the accused. Environmental crimes best illustrate the benefits of 
allowing the prosecutor, the accused and the courts to use the consensus-
based procedure that could lead to real environmental remediation. We 
explore below the application of this procedure to environmental crimes in 
South Africa. We hope to generate insights into how the South African 
experience can illuminate areas where the consensus-based criminal 
enforcement process can be refined. 
4 Plea and sentence in South African environmental 
criminal cases 
When an environmental crime is committed, the harm suffered is often 
diffuse, and sometimes there are many offenders, which makes it difficult to 
attribute the criminal conduct to any specific individual or corporation. This 
would be so in cases of non-point source water and air pollution, the 
                                            
65  Jansen v The State 2015 ZASCA 151 (2 October 2015). 
66  Abbot 2005 JEL 172. 
67  Abbot 2005 JEL 170. Such fines often have insignificant deterrence effect. For a 
history and evaluation of criminal sanctions in environmental law in the United States 
see McMurry and Ramsey 1986 Loy LA L Rev 1133-1169. 
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dumping of waste, or mobile vehicular emissions, among others.68 
Furthermore, the "environment" as the object of criminal conduct may be 
difficult to identify, which makes it difficult to identify the complainant, 
resulting in the state’s shouldering the burden– as the custodian of the 
environment.69 There are obvious exceptions where the conduct in question 
has caused harm or damage to specific individuals or an environment on 
which identifiable individuals rely to sustain their livelihoods.  
The potential attractiveness of the plea and sentence agreement procedure 
in environmental criminal enforcement is magnified when one considers the 
question of corporate offenders. The enforcement of environmental crimes 
against companies is notoriously complicated by the company being a legal 
fiction.70 Neither can it be imprisoned, nor can the directors, who are merely 
agents of the company be imprisoned – unless the law creates an 
exception. This leaves financial penalties as the most viable sanction 
against companies.71 This has been quite ineffective, given that companies 
often have the funds to pay financial penalties and budget for such 
eventualities.72 The justice of imprisoning company representatives for the 
crimes of the company is also constitutionally questionable,73 although it is 
provided for in South African environmental,74 corporate75 and criminal 
procedure legislation.76 In S v Coetzee the court highlighted the rationale 
for corporate criminal liability and held that: 
Directors, of course, occupy a special position of responsibility, not only in 
relation to the corporate body but also with regard to the public in general. The 
State consequently has an important interest in ensuring that the affairs of 
corporate bodies are properly and honestly conducted. The corporate body 
                                            
68  Non-point pollution includes run-off from agricultural lands, or the pollution of a body 
of water by a municipality. It is difficult to attribute criminal liability to the many 
farmers involved. 
69  The state as custodian or trustee of the environment. 
70  In Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 (5) 
SA 333 (W) para 16, the directors went to the extent of resigning en masse to avoid 
legal liability for water pollution caused by their mining company. 
71  See s 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
72  Fisse and Braithwaite Corporations, Crime and Accountability 1-2, 9-10 (giving 
examples where corporations walked away from offences by paying their way out). 
73  S v Coetzee 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC). Also see Woodka 1992 Tulane Envtl LJ 635, 
654-60 (noting the pitfalls of the corporate liability regime in the USA). 
74  Section 34(5)-(9) read with s 49A and Schedule 3 of the NEMA imposes vicarious 
criminal liability on companies or employers for certain actions of directors, 
employees or servants where the environmental offence can be attributed to their 
conduct. This is limited to Schedule 3 offences and not every environmental offence. 
The offences include water pollution, under the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (the 
National Water Act), s 151. 
75  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
76  Section 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Snyman Criminal Law 246-247. 
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itself has to be protected against the dishonesty and other criminal conduct of 
those in charge of its affairs or who are involved with them. It would not in itself 
be unreasonable to provide special measures to enable the prosecution to 
overcome the difficulty of gathering evidence about corporate activities. This 
would be consistent with the State's duty to protect society.77 
The crux of plea and sentence agreements is that the state and the accused 
negotiate a guilty plea where the accused person admits to certain charges 
in exchange for the possible imposition of a reduced sentence.78 This 
process gives the state better powers to obtain remediation or 
compensation orders from the accused, which the state would otherwise not 
secure through normal sentencing processes. 
4.1 Connecting general provisions in section 105A Criminal 
Procedure Act to environmental crimes 
South Africa has been promoting industrialisation through development 
activities aimed at growing the economy and creating jobs to alleviate 
poverty. These development activities are heavily anchored in the country's 
mining and other energy intensive industries such as the iron and steel 
industry, manufacturing and agricultural processing. Most of the cases 
reviewed in this paper concern mining or extractive activities, which are the 
hotspots for environmental crimes in South Africa. This is not to discount 
the urgency of other environmental crimes like rhinoceros poaching. The 
impact of mining activities on the environment is well documented.79 
Mining activities cause environmental damage in various ways, including 
the degradation of land, the disturbance of ecosystems, and water80 and air 
pollution.81 Mining can also destabilise the social fabric and livelihoods of 
the surrounding communities.82 In response to the deleterious effects that 
mining and other activities not necessarily related to mining have on the 
environment, the legislature enacted various pieces of legislation to regulate 
                                            
77  S v Coetzee 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC) para 48; For an extended analysis of the 
implications of this case on the development of corporate criminal liability see 
Farisani 2017 Fundamina 1, 8-13 (where the author discusses the complexities of 
proving the elements of criminal liability against a director. This is very relevant to 
environmental crimes, where oftentimes the men rea is lacking or difficult to prove - 
hence the overreliance on strict liability in many environmental statutes). 
78  See Watney 2006 TSAR 224. 
79  See generally Bell and Donnelly Mining and its Impact on the Environment; Ochieng, 
Seanego and Nkwonta 2010 Sci Res Essays, cf Bridge 2004 Annu Rev Environ 
Resour. 
80  McCarthy 2011 S Afr J Sci 3-4; Ochieng, Seanego and Nkwonta 2010 Sci Res 
Essays 3353. 
81  Bridge 2004 Annu Rev Environ Resour 211, 213. 
82  Petrova and Marinova 2013 Rural Society 159-160; Cronjé and Chenga 2009 Dev 
South Afr 414. 
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such activities that have a detrimental effect on the environment.83 In recent 
years, however, the violation of environmental and mining legislation has 
reached worrying levels. This is evident from the number of criminal 
convictions achieved in South African courts in respect of violations of 
environmental regulations, as reported in the National Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement Reports. 84 We review a sample of these 
cases in the next section. 
4.2 Plea and sentencing agreements before the courts 
In S v Anker Coal & Mineral Holdings S.A. (Pty) Ltd,85 the plea and sentence 
agreement arose after the accused contravened the NEMA86 and the 
MPRDA.87 The accused company conducted prospecting activities on a 
wetland by drilling prospecting holes in a sensitive area. The company then 
failed to rehabilitate all the boreholes that had been left unsealed88 in the 
time period stated in a compliance notice89 issued by the regulators. The 
company also furnished the Department of Mineral Resources with incorrect 
information.90 The accused company was sentenced to a total fine of 
ZAR180 000 (which was suspended for five years) on three of the charges; 
and secondly, it was ordered to pay the sum of ZAR80 000 to Mpumalanga 
                                            
83  See the NEMA, the MPRDA and the National Water Act, among others. 
84  Annual reports of the Environmental Management Inspectorate (EMIs) National 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Reports show variation from year to 
year of criminal convictions and cases concluded. These reports are available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/emi. The 2009/10 Report 
states that "There has been a significant increase in the number of plea bargains 
from the 4 in 2008/9 to 134 in 2009/10". This is a significant increase in the number 
of accused persons seeking plea settlements. Then the 2012/13 Report notes that, 
"There has been a 7.69% (14) increase in the number of plea and sentence 
agreements reached in 2012/13, compared to the 13 reported in 2011/12". The 
2013/14 Report records that "There has been a decrease in the number of plea and 
sentence agreements reached from 14 in 2012/13 to 11 reported in 2013/14". These 
statistics show that the use of the plea and sentence agreement procedure peaked 
in 2009-2010 and slowly receded in 2013-2014. 
85  S v Anker Coal and Mineral Holdings SA (Pty) Ltd (Ermelo Regional Court) 
(unreported) case number ESH 8/11 (undated) (Anker Coal). 
86  Section 28(14)(a) of the NEMA was repealed in 2013, and the essence of the section 
is now captured in s 49A(1)(e)-(g), which provides that "(1) A person is guilty of an 
offence if that person- (e) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commits any act 
or omission which causes significant pollution or degradation of the environment or 
is likely to cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment; (f) unlawfully 
and intentionally or negligently commit[s] any act or omission which detrimentally 
affects or is likely to detrimentally affect the environment; (g) fails to comply with a 
directive issued in terms of this Act". 
87  Sections 98(a)(iv) and 98(b) of the MPRDA. 
88  Section 93(1)(B)(1) MPRDA. 
89  Issued in terms of s 93(1)(B) of the MPRDA. 
90  Contravening s 98(b) read with ss 1, 99(1)(g), and 108 of the MPRDA. 
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Tourism Parks Agency to empower its mandate, and lastly ZAR144 000 was 
to be paid as compensation to the owner of the farm91 on which the 
environmental damage had been caused.  
In S v Golfview Mining (Pty) Ltd,92 the accused company contravened the 
NEMA93 and the National Water Act.94 In particular, the accused company 
was charged with the offences of conducting mining operations on a 
wetland, diverting a watercourse without the required water use licence, 
failing to separate dirty and clean water at a mining site contrary to the 
National Water Act, failing to deposit the "run of mine coal" within opencast 
box-cut areas, dumping overburden stockpile rocks into a river, failing to 
construct the required water pollution control measures, and commencing 
with listed activities without the relevant environmental authorisation (EIA 
approval).95  
On a plea and sentence agreement the accused company was convicted of 
the offences charged and sentenced to a fine of ZAR1 million, which was 
wholly suspended for a five-year period. The accused was also ordered to 
pay ZAR1 million to the Water Research Council, ZAR1 million to the 
Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency, and a further ZAR1 million to the 
Mpumalanga Department of Economic Development, Environment and 
Tourism. All payments were to be made within specified time frames and 
the judgment was enforceable as a civil judgment by the parties in whose 
favour the awards were made. In addition, three professors were to compile 
a peer-reviewed rehabilitation report in consultation with the then 
Department of Water Affairs. The report was to be compiled at the cost of 
the company, which was also ordered to thereafter comply with the report's 
                                            
91  This compensation was ordered in terms of s 300(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
(the court may award compensation where an offence causes damage to or loss of 
property) which provides that "Where a person is convicted by a superior court, a 
regional court or a magistrate's court of an offence which has caused damage to or 
loss of property (including money) belonging to some other person, the court in 
question may, upon the application of the injured person or of the prosecutor acting 
on the instructions of the injured person, forthwith award the injured person 
compensation for such damage or loss". 
92  S v Golfview Mining (Pty) Ltd (Ermelo Regional Court) (unreported) case Number 
ESH 82/11 (undated) (Golfview). 
93  Sections 28(14) (now 49A) and 24F(1)(a) of the NEMA. S 24F(1)(a) read with s 
49A(1)(a) of the NEMA prohibits the commencement with an activity listed as 
requiring an environmental authorisation (granted after an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA)) without the necessary authorisation. 
94  Section 151(1)(a) of the National Water Act. In terms of this section undertaking a 
water use, as defined in s 21, without a water use licence is a criminal offence. 
95  Golfview 4-6. These offences contravened the National Water Act, the NEMA, and 
the MPRDA. 
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recommendations. 
In Golfview the company was co-charged with three of its directors or agents 
against whom all charges were withdrawn (with future immunity from 
prosecution) as part of the plea and sentence agreement. This is a matter 
to which we shall revert later, regarding the potential of this procedure to be 
used by negligent or reckless agents of the company to escape liability. 
Together with this factor, the court did not record the relationship between 
Anker Coal (convicted earlier in the same year of similar offences) and 
Golfview. Golfview was a subsidiary of Anker Coal (the accused in S v Anker 
Coal). 
In S v Vunene Mining (Pty) Ltd,96 the accused company, charged together 
with two of its director or agents, contravened the NEMA and the National 
Water Act.97 The accused commenced with listed activities without the 
required environmental authorisation, mining in a wetland and polluting 
water resources without a water use licence. The accused company was 
found guilty amongst other matters of using water contrary to section 21 the 
National Water Act,98 commencing activities99 without an environmental 
authorisation from the Department of Environmental Affairs, and committing 
acts or omissions which were likely to affect the environment in a significant 
manner. The unlawful activities had taken place for five years, from 2007 to 
2012. All charges were withdrawn against the director and agents of the 
company, and the company itself was convicted of its plea of the offences 
and sentenced, in terms of an agreement, to rehabilitate the damaged 
environment, to pay ZAR750 000.00 to the Environmental Protection 
Agency, to pay ZAR250 000.00 to Ermelo Animals Rescue Services, to pay 
ZAR1.5 million to the Inspection, Compliance and Monitoring division of the 
Wildlife Protection Services Office of Ermelo, and to pay ZAR500 000 to 
Working for Wetlands, a non-governmental organisation towards their 
                                            
96  S v Vunene Mining (Pty) Ltd (Ermelo Regional Court) (unreported) case number 
94/11/2010 (undated) (Vunene Mining). 
97  Sections 28(14)(a) (now 49A) and 24F(1)(a) of NEMA and s 151(1)(a) of the National 
Water Act. 
98  The National Water Act specifies certain water uses that cannot be undertaken 
without a water use licence. Thus s 21 defines water use as meaning, for instance, 
"(a)- taking water from a water resource; 21(b)- storing water 21 (f) -discharging 
waste or water containing waste into a water resource through a pipe, canal, sewer, 
sea outfall or other conduit". 
99  The listed activities included the construction of facilities or infrastructure to store 
250 tons or more of coal, the removal of indigenous vegetation from 3 hectares or 
more, and dredging, excavating, infilling, removing or moving soils exceeding 5 cubic 
meters from a floodplain or wetland. These activities are now listed in revised 
environmental authorisation regulations. 
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research and planning on wetlands in South Africa. The court also ordered 
the company to appear back in court after five years on 7 December 2017, 
in order that the court might assess if there had been compliance with the 
sentencing agreement.100 A follow-up inquiry as to whether the company 
complied with its undertakings in 2017 was not responded to by the relevant 
prosecutors' offices or the beneficiary entities.  
As in the other cases discussed above, in S v Nkomati Anthracite (Pty) 
Ltd101 the accused was convicted for transgressing the NEMA and the 
National Water Act.102 The accused commenced with listed activities without 
the relevant environmental authorisation in terms of the NEMA, and in the 
process polluted water resources, thus contravening the National Water Act. 
After agreeing on a plea and a just sentence the accused company was 
sentenced to a ZAR1 million fine, which was suspended for five years. The 
accused company was also compelled to pay ZAR4 million to the 
Environmental Management Inspectorate, the enforcement arm for 
specified environmental management legislation in South Africa. The 
money was to be used by the Inspectorate for purposes of remedying 
environmental damage.  
In a different case, an iron and steel company entered into a plea and 
sentence agreement for contravening provisions of the NEMA, the Criminal 
Procedure Act and the National Environmental Management: Waste Act. 
The accused company in that case, S v UNICA Iron Steel (Pty) Ltd,103 
continued with the prohibited activities despite a compliance notice issued 
by the Department of Environmental Affairs to cease, desist and comply. 
The repeated failure to comply with administrative notices demonstrates 
why sometimes the enforcement agencies have no option but to pursue 
criminal prosecution.  
In S v Samancor Chrome Ltd SHL72/2012 the accused company operated 
a waste disposal site for about 11 years, from August 1997 to February 
2005, without the necessary permit, in contravention of the Environment 
                                            
100  In terms of s 297(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, if an accused has complied with 
the conditions of a postponed sentence he or she shall be discharged and "such 
discharge shall have the effect of an acquittal, except that the conviction shall be 
recorded as a previous conviction" (my emphasis). 
101  S v Nkomati Anthracite (Pty) Ltd (Nelspruit Regional Court) (unreported) case 
number SH 412/13 (undated). 
102  Section 24F(1)(a) of NEMA and s 151(1)(a) of the National Water Act. 
103  S v UNICA Iron Steel (Pty) Ltd (Temba, Hammanskraal) (unreported) case number 
386/12/2013 (undated). 
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Conservation Act and the NEMA.104 Secondly, the company was charged 
for allowing dust from the bag house facility which contained chrome and 
hazardous substances to be disposed of within its premises by its 
employees and managers without a permit.  
The company was charged in terms of section 332(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which provides for circumstances in which a company may 
be liable for the criminal conduct of its directors or servants. The company 
had also not done an environmental assessment as then required by law.105 
The accused agreed to plead guilty and to be sentenced to an agreed 
sentence of a fine of ZAR200 000. The accused was also ordered to pay 
ZAR700 000106 to the Department of Environmental Affairs to be used 
together with Steelpoort Primary School in liaison with the Department of 
Education to "develop suitable environmental initiatives for the benefit of 
[the school]".107 In addition, the accused agreed to and was ordered to pay 
ZAR1 million108 to the Environmental Management Inspectorate (EMI) for 
"proper execution of their duties, environmental rehabilitation and 
enforcement training". Lastly the accused agreed to pay ZAR100 000 to the 
Department of Environmental Affairs towards prosecution costs.  
In S v Acker109 the accused individual was charged with the offence of 
contravening the National Water Act in that a distillery operated by Whitby 
Distillers and Liquor Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd disposed of the spent, untreated 
                                            
104  Section 20(1) read with s 29(4) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989, and 
s 34(3)-(4) of the NEMA (read with Schedule 3). 
105  GN 1196 in GG 15832 of 8 July 1994. 
106  Ordered in terms of the then s 34(3) of the NEMA, which provided that "Whenever 
any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the 
court convicting such person may summarily enquire into and assess the monetary 
value of any advantage gained or likely to be gained by such person in consequence 
of that offence, and. In addition to any other punishment imposed in respect of that 
offence, the court may order the award of damages or compensation or a fine equal 
to the amount so assessed" (my emphasis). 
107  S v Samancor Chrome Ltd (unreported) case number SHL72/2012 (undated) 13. 
108  Ordered in terms of s 297(1)(a)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and s 34(1) of 
the NEMA which then provided that "Whenever any person is convicted of an offence 
under any provision listed in Sch 3 and it appears that such person has by that 
offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state or other person, including the 
cost incurred or likely to be incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating the 
environment or preventing damage to the environment. The court may in the same 
proceedings at the written request of the Minister or other organ of state or other 
person concerned, and in the presence of the convicted person, inquire summarily 
and without pleadings into the amount of the loss or damage so caused" (emphasis 
added). 
109  S v Acker (Hermanus Regional Court) (unreported) case number ECH 100/05 
(October 2005). Interview feedback disclosed that this matter went on appeal as 
accused failed to fully comply with its own undertakings. 
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cooling water generated from the alcohol distilling process into the Klipdrift 
River. Since the unlawful discharge the company had taken extensive steps 
to construct a new cooling system and upgrade its plant, with the result that 
at the time of the hearing of the case there was no more unlawful discharge 
of cooling water into the river. The court sentenced the accused to payment 
of the sum of ZAR35 000 annually for a deserving research student studying 
at the Chemical Engineering Department of the University of Cape Town. 
The student would study the distillery and focus on research that had not as 
yet been conducted. In addition, in terms of the sentencing agreement the 
accused agreed to apply for a waste management licence from the relevant 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, as well as to monitor water quality 
in the Klipdrift River over a three-year period. At the end of the three years, 
several of the terms were not complied with and the accused appealed 
whereupon the compliance period was extended to three years. 
In S v Melville110 the accused was charged with the offences of contravening 
provisions of the National Environmental Management Act. The accused 
was found guilty of commencing activities without an environmental 
authorisation. The accused had transformed or removed indigenous 
vegetation of three hectares within a critically endangered or endangered 
ecosystem listed in terms of the National Environmental Biodiversity Act.111 
This activity was listed as an activity that could not be undertaken without 
an environmental impact assessment and authorisation being issued first. 
The accused was issued with a compliance notice which he disregarded. 
The accused persisted with the activity despite being issued with further 
compliance notices on two more occasions, thereby contravening NEMA.112 
There is an explicit statement that the fact that “the accused had on three 
occasions intentionally transgressed the compliance order shows a 
tendency of civil disobedience".113 Upon his plea of guilty, on the first count 
the accused was sentenced by agreement to eighteen months 
imprisonment wholly suspended for five years provided the accused 
concluded an environmental assessment and submitted a rectification 
application114 within six months. Secondly, the accused was ordered to 
commission a rehabilitation or restoration plan by an ecologist at his own 
cost. On the remaining three counts relating to failure to comply with 
compliance notices, he was ordered to pay ZAR30 000 or six months 
                                            
110  S v Mellvile (Kirkwood) (unreported) case number A513/09 (undated). 
111  Section 52 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
112  Section 31N(1) read with s 31N(3), 31L(1)(4) and (5) of NEMA. 
113  S v Mellvile (Kirkwood) (unreported) case number A513/09 (undated) 8. 
114  In terms of s 24G of the NEMA. 
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imprisonment, of which ZAR10 000 or two months imprisonment were 
suspended for five years on condition that the accused did not committed 
similar offence. This appears quite lenient, given the obstinacy and 
deliberateness of the accused's conduct.  
In the cases reviewed above relating to mining activities and the 
contravention of the water legislation, common mitigation and aggravating 
factors were considered. We discuss these mitigating circumstances across 
the cases, because they indicate the extent, if any, to which the courts, in 
accepting sentence agreements, are attaching any weight to considerations 
of environmental sustainability.  
In S v Anker Coal, S v Golfview, S v UNICA, S v Samancor and S v Vunene 
Mining the courts considered the following as mitigating factors. Broadly, 
that the accused by pleading guilty averted lengthy trials that could cost the 
state a lot of money,115 that the accused cooperated with the prosecuting 
authorities, that the plea secured convictions which the state may have 
struggled to secure,116 the need to deter future offenders, to demonstrate 
that environmental legislation applies to all persons, and that the 
environmental rights in section 24 of the Constitution are important. 
Also in mitigation, across these mining cases, the court noted that the 
mining companies "contributed to the economic and social development"117 
of the areas where they are undertaking mining (although in none of the 
cases did the court elaborate on how the polluting activity produced any 
social or economic benefits), that they provided employment,118 where the 
mineral concerned was coal the court noted that the accused contributed 
"to much needed production of electricity in South Africa through mining 
operations",119 and that the accused companies undertook to rehabilitate 
the affected environments thereby possibly preventing long-term damage. 
                                            
115  This is despite s 34 of the NEMA, which anyway gives the court extensive powers to 
order cost recovery against a convicted accused, with or without a sentence 
agreement. 
116  This is in the context of the difficulty of gathering and presenting evidence in 
environmental crimes. 
117  Anker Coal para 7.1.2.4-6; Samancor 10; Golfview para 9.1.2.3 -5.  
118  While employment statistics were presented in some of the cases, no details of the 
nature and types of jobs created were provided. In Golfview it is vaguely stated in 
mitigation that "[t]he accused provides employment to several people". 
119  Golfview para 9.1.2.5; S v Acker para 7.1.2.6. Two observations can be made about 
this mitigation factor; firstly, mines are among the biggest consumers of electricity in 
the country and secondly, even though the accused is assisting by providing 
electricity (via coal mining) to the country, they do not do so for free. The companies 
are rewarded handsomely for supplying coal to Eskom. This really should not strictly 
be looked at as a factor in mitigation. 
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In some of the cases the court noted that there was no intention by the 
accused to offend, but mere negligence arising often from their reliance on 
expert consultants to guide compliance with environmental legislation.120 In 
the cases where wetlands were at issue, the court took into account that 
South Africa as a signatory of the Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR 1975) 
is bound to protect wetlands.121 Whether the accused was a first offender 
and the seriousness of environmental offences were emphasised as 
mitigating and aggravating factors respectively in some of the cases. 
In Vunene Mining the court particularly emphasised that: 
[t]he mining industry is in fact self-regulated with the department of Mineral 
Resources being under staffed and- equipped to conduct enforcement and as 
such require strong ethical and moral standards by the mining industry to 
comply to the strictest sense with the approved environmental authorizations 
… As stated in De-Blom-case a person working in a specific sphere of activity 
ought to know the law relating to that activity.122 
The court in Vunene Mining also considered that "the accused profited from 
the monetary gain by mining and removing coal in some portions which was 
not approved or provided for in an environmental management programme. 
Those gains were thus obtained through unlawful conduct."123 In contrast, 
in the non-mining cases like Acker and Mellvile the court did not deal with 
the socio-economic contributions of the activities as mitigating factors, nor 
did the court discuss the employment created by the accused. This 
demonstrates the general tendency by the courts to regard mining and 
extractive activities as more economically beneficial than other land uses 
such as agriculture. This runs against current research, which shows that 
extractive activities, particularly mining, are having devastating 
environmental and social impacts not only in South Africa124 but in many 
resource-rich countries.125  
While the courts in most of these settled cases displayed awareness of the 
                                            
120  This was the case in Golfview 9, where the court reiterated that despite the fact that 
an environmental contractor had been hired to ensure compliance, the company 
remained responsible and accountable for the negligence of their environmental 
consultants. 
121  For instance, in Anker Coal para 7.1.3.8, "South Africa is a signatory to the RAMSAR 
convention and as such bound thereto to protect our wetlands". 
122  Vunene Mining para 7.1.3(12). 
123  Vunene Mining para 7.1.3(15). 
124  Cronje and Chenga 2009 Dev South Afr 413, 421.  
125  For detailed analyses of socio-environmental impacts of mining see generally Hilson 
2002 Land Use Policy 65-73; Hamann 2004 Nat Resour Forum 270-290; Helwege 
2015 Extractive Industries and Society 73-84; Moomen 2017 Resources Policy 85-
93; Franks, Brereton and Moran 2010 IAPA 299-312. 
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seriousness of environmental offences and of the importance of 
environmental rights, a number of factors discussed in the next section 
indicate an entrenched human-centred approach that overemphasises 
economically useful but environmentally destructive activities. This 
anthropocentric approach seems to have diminished the criminal 
reprehensibility of environmental offenders. 
Be that as it may, this group of cases, taken together, is the culmination of 
an emerging trend towards the use of consensus-based environmental 
dispute resolution mechanisms embedded in the criminal justice system. 
Regardless of the potential pitfalls, the procedure is an innovation in 
environmental enforcement and regulation in South Africa. A follow-up on 
the sampled cases to assess whether in fact the terms of the agreements 
were complied with yielded mixed but largely disappointing results that are 
discussed below. The research also confirmed one of the persistent 
challenges with environmental regulation in South Africa, which is a lack of 
access to information. In most of the cases it was practically impossible to 
get feedback on whether the sentencing agreement terms had been 
complied with. Many of the agencies simply did not respond to the 
researchers' questionnaire. 
5 Evaluating the effectiveness of sentencing agreements 
in environmental enforcement 
The effectiveness of an environmental enforcement tool can be measured 
through various methods. The rate of detection, the success of prosecution, 
the conviction rates and environmental integrity can be indicators of the 
effectiveness of a criminal justice system, together with the deterrent effect 
of sentences imposed. However, in environmental enforcement these are 
insufficient as indicators of what one may term substantive effectiveness. 
Substantive effectiveness in this context refers to whether a tool is in fact 
effective in dealing with the environment problem concerned. This is akin to 
what, in international environmental law, Bodansky terms "problem- solving 
effectiveness", which "focusses on the degree to which a treaty achieves its 
objectives or, more generally, solves the environmental problem it 
addresses".126 In the domestic context, this level of evaluation considers 
how environmental legislation or an enforcement tool solves the 
environmental mischief it was meant to address.127 In most cases this is not 
                                            
126  Bodansky Art and Craft of International Environmental Law 253.  
127  Patterson "Incentive-based Measures" 329. In S v Acker, the order resulted in 
improved supervision of the Klipdrift River, although the accused struggled to do the 
sampling, analysis and reporting correctly until they hired an external expert.  
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the case, as typically demonstrated by the environmental levies and taxes 
that are hardly used for cleaning up the source of pollution.  
Most of the criminal justice system indicators simply demonstrate how good 
the criminal process is, but they do not show how the environment is being 
protected. If we were alert to the objectives of environmental regulation 
articulated above, we would see effectiveness in an improved environment, 
the rehabilitation of damaged areas, cleaner water and air, and ecologically 
sustainable and healthy ecosystems. Measuring the latter can be difficult in 
the absence of good technology, tools, financial resources and expertise, 
coupled with the continuous monitoring and reporting of data. The role of 
environmental civil society and public interest environmental organisations 
is crucial to complement the meagre resources and incapacity of 
government enforcement agencies in developing countries. 
In 2017 we undertook the task of following up with the prosecuting 
authorities and the government departments involved in the sampled cases. 
The aim was to evaluate whether the terms and conditions of the sentence 
agreements were complied with or enforced. Despite continued requests 
there was feedback on one case only, namely S v Acker. The feedback 
received was insightful and indicative of the strengths and pitfalls of this 
consensual procedure to environmental enforcement. Of the eight 
settlement terms, five had not been fully complied with within the stipulated 
timeframes. While the company had applied for authorisation of the existing 
waste water storage dam, the outcome was not available; the research 
student had not been selected on time, and the monitoring of the water 
quality of the Klipdrift River was monitored erratically. Regarding the latter, 
the Department of Water and Sanitation reported that data was collected at 
the wrong sites, and the water samples that had been collected and 
analysed had not been properly reported on as agreed.128 The department 
had to commission its own sampling and analysis.  
The accused failed to fully comply, and on the return date the court decided 
not to discharge the accused, but extended the compliance period for 
another three years. The extension was to enable the student to consult and 
complete the research, on the basis of which other terms depended for 
implementation. The feedback on the research student indicates that the 
accused company complied with the payment of ZAR35 000 to sponsor the 
student. However, this could not be confirmed with certainty in court at the 
                                            
128  Empirical feedback data on file with the authors. 
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expiration of the three-year period. 
The cases reviewed above and the factors which the courts considered in 
aggravation and mitigation as well as the sentences imposed show that 
sentencing agreements have the potential to fulfil the overall objects of 
environmental regulation. In some of the cases where wetlands or water 
bodies were damaged or threatened, the courts made reference to the 
principles of environmental management in the NEMA and international 
environmental law treaties.129 The aspirations that inspire South African 
environmental law are enshrined in section 24 of the Constitution of South 
Africa. Overall there is a case for better monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of sentence agreements to hold accused persons 
accountable.  
However, the circumstances of each of the cases discussed above also 
demonstrate the potential areas of weakness of the procedure. Firstly, the 
requirement in South African law that the accused must be represented to 
negotiate a plea and sentence agreement already excludes many 
environmental offenders who may not be able to afford legal representation.  
Secondly, a bigger potential pitfall is the lack of sufficient scientific and 
financial data to enable prosecutors to negotiate a fair agreement with the 
accused. This is the case especially with corporate offenders, who may very 
well have deep pockets to pay any fine or compensation ordered. It is 
difficult to assess whether the agreed penalties were high enough to make 
the companies feel the pinch without knowing the complete financial 
circumstances of a company. As Abbot states: 
[f]rom an economic perspective, low fines are not conducive to effective 
deterrence and compliance because they contribute to a reduction in the 
expected punishment. Coupled with the cautious approach to prosecution, the 
deterrent effect of this enforcement tool is limited.130 
Good data can also assist the offending company by ensuring that any order 
it agrees to does not impose disproportionate financial obligations through 
costly compliance orders. Cognisance should be taken of the tendency of 
companies to pass on any such costs of compliance to the ultimate 
beneficiaries of environmental law - the ordinary consumer who pays 
increased prices for the products or services provided by the offending 
                                            
129  In Anker Coal and Vunene Mining, the court referred to s 2(4)(r) NEMA principles on 
the protection of sensitive and vulnerable ecosystems. 
130  Abbot 2005 JEL 170. 
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company.131 Apart from this, it remains difficult to quantify the actual loss 
suffered when a wetland is destroyed or a species is lost,132 hence any 
pretence to estimate what an accused should pay to offset or restore a 
damaged part of the environment is largely guesswork.  
A more detailed study is required to assess the sentence agreements 
against the annual turnover or profits made by the accused companies 
when they were sentenced. It has been argued that any financial penalty 
imposed on a company should consider the interests of broader society in 
maintaining the survival of the company. Therefore, it must be a fine that 
the company can afford to pay without going insolvent, which might have 
social repercussions.133 
The third potential weakness is that using the criminal justice system to 
"exonerate" criminal conduct de-stigmatises environmental offences and 
some of the agreed service orders and rehabilitation orders could eventually 
launder the accused.134 The accused company appears as an 
environmentally conscious and pro-environment company. This requires 
the court to publicise that the accused is not undertaking the project or 
rehabilitation services voluntarily but as a result of a criminal prosecution. It 
is necessary to maintain and publicise the criminal blameworthiness of the 
accused where for instance the accused had unlawfully and repeatedly 
contravened the law despite receiving cease and desist orders from 
environmental enforcement agencies. This would be so in cases like 
Mellville.  
In most of the cases it is evident that the court did not seriously attach 
criminal blameworthiness to the accused. This was evidently difficult in 
cases where the company was the accused and there were no readily 
identifiable employees or directors responsible for the conduct causing 
environmental violations. In cases where this connection was apparent, the 
                                            
131  What Abbot 2005 JEL 171 calls the "spillover effect on 'innocent' third parties". 
132  Oliver 2016 Science 220, 221 noting that "It is a tricky problem to say how much 
biodiversity loss is too much". Schröter and Van Oudenhoven 2016 Trends Ecol Evol 
333-334. Also see generally Costanza et al "Value of the World's Ecosystem 
Services" 117. 
133  Abbot 2005 JEL 172. 
134  This is in a context where environmental crime is still looked at as an economic 
crime. See Mares 2010 Crit Criminol 280, who argues that even "though 
criminologists have been expanding our view and understanding of what crime is, 
and despite the fact that some environmental crimes are now considered as heinous 
as traditional street crimes, ecologically harmful behavior continues to be largely 
viewed as an economic issue". 
T MUROMBO & I MUNYUKI  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  30 
court used stronger language of disapproval. This is evident in S v 
Samancor, for instance. 
It is important to note that the plea and sentence process presupposes a 
punitive dialogue overseen by the court between environmental authorities 
and perpetrators which dialogue is, inter alia, aimed at punishing the 
perpetrator, rehabilitating the environment and promoting environmental 
awareness and compliance with environmental laws.135  
There is no silver bullet enforcement mechanism. Different combinations 
will be required, depending on the context of each regulator.136 
6 Conclusion: The future of negotiated enforcement in 
South Africa 
Courts remain central and final arbiters of the punishment and penalty 
imposed for environmental offences. However, the resurgence of 
negotiated settlements culminating in plea and sentence agreements 
signals a shift in environmental enforcement that could lead to better 
outcomes for the environment. The process of plea bargaining is 
consultative and participatory, involving environmental agencies, 
prosecuting authorities, environmental civil society and others stakeholders 
who have a vested interest in genuinely protecting the environment. The 
process thus recognises that the accused in environmental cases often has 
an important role to play in the economy and in society, which explains the 
consideration of the social contribution of the accused in mitigation of 
sentence, particularly for companies which contribute to economic 
development. The South African experience with plea and sentence 
agreements is therefore promising in theory. In practice, the absence of 
concrete information regarding the implementation and compliance with the 
terms and conditions of sentencing agreements is one of many concerns. 
This indicates the need for strong law enforcement institutions that follow 
through on undertakings by errant companies and individuals. Our study 
demonstrates that there will be no problem-solving effectiveness from the 
plea and sentence agreement procedure until general enforcement and 
institutional capacity are strengthened.  
To the extent that monetary compensations and remediation orders still rely 
                                            
135  This is evident from the investigative process and the agreement of the sentence 
between the environmental authorities and the perpetrators. 
136  Nel and Wessels 2010 PELJ 54. 
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on the financial muscle of the offender, the process remains open to 
manipulation by corporate offenders with deep pockets. Wherever money is 
involved, the temptation for corrupt behaviour to creep in cannot be ruled 
out. Thus, the South African process leaves the enforcement agencies 
potentially exposed to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour.  
Procedurally, the process in South Africa for negotiating and concluding 
plea and sentence agreements is complicated, cumbersome and too 
technical for the ordinary person. Where community members are 
interested and affected parties, legal assistance would be necessary to 
enable them to meaningfully influence the terms and conditions of the 
agreed penalties. Perhaps this justifies the requirement that only legally 
represented accused persons can resort to negotiating a plea and sentence 
agreement. 
Some of the agreements discussed in this paper have demonstrated that 
the levels of penalties agreed and the orders are not as heavy as expected. 
Related to the leniency of the penalties and remediation orders, this study 
also demonstrated that the plea and sentence process could destigmatise 
environmental crimes and lend an element of legitimacy to sacrificing 
environmental integrity for economic priorities. That the court and the 
prosecutors in most of the cases factored into account the economic 
contribution of the accused's activities in mitigation indicates a propensity to 
treat environmental crimes as less heinous than other crimes. This attitude 
could negatively affect the efficacy of the criminal justice system as a tool 
to enforce environmental laws. 
Arguably, the plea and sentence process, if effectively used, may present 
an effective and satisfactory mechanism to police offences of non-
compliance, as it foregrounds the unique ingredients of reformation, 
remediation and deterrence, which are difficult to find in other environment 
enforcement mechanisms. For instance, it is difficult to see how a 
perpetrator who has received numerous directives or compliance notices 
alerting her to her unlawful actions and calling upon him to remedy or to 
desist from such unlawful conduct, or a perpetrator who wilfully fails to 
obtain a permit or authorisation, can be reformed by anything other than a 
criminal sanction imbued with environmental remediation principles. The 
effectiveness of the plea and sentence agreement therefore lies in its ability 
not only to punish the perpetrator but also to make provision for the 
rehabilitation of the damaged environment in furtherance of environmental 
regulation and enforcement. 
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We conclude that further empirical research is necessary to establish the 
efficacy of consensus-based processes to make criminal enforcement lead 
to real protection of the environment. Enforcement mechanisms that result 
in the remediation of environmental damage and rehabilitation are the better 
option, and it is hoped that South African experimentation with sentence 
agreements can influence other jurisdictions in the region that hope to make 
the best out of criminal penalties in environmental enforcement.  
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